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Abstract
Machine learning (ML) systems are deployed in critical settings, but they might fail in
unexpected ways, impacting the accuracy of their predictions. Poisoning attacks against ML
induce adversarial modification of data used by an ML algorithm to selectively change the output
of the ML algorithm when it is deployed. In this work, we introduce a novel data poisoning
attack called a subpopulation attack, which is particularly relevant when datasets are large and
diverse. We design a modular framework for subpopulation attacks and show that they are
effective for a variety of datasets and ML models. Compared to existing backdoor poisoning
attacks, subpopulation attacks have the advantage of not requiring modification of the testing
data to induce misclassification. We also provide an impossibility result for defending against
subpopulation attacks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) systems are being deployed in sensitive applications, but they can fail
in multiple ways, impacting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of user data [KBA+19].
To date, evasion attacks or inference-time attacks have been studied extensively in image classi-
fication [SZS+14, GSS14, CW17], speech recognition [CW18, SKZ+18], and cyber security [SL14,
XQE16, KBAR+18]. Still, among the threats ML systems are vulnerable to, poisoning attacks
against ML at training time have recently surfaced as the threat perceived as most potentially
dangerous to companies’ ML infrastructures [SSKNL+20]. The threat of poisoning attacks becomes
even more severe as modern ML systems rely on large, diverse datasets, and their size makes it
difficult to guarantee the trustworthiness of the training data.
Existing poisoning attacks can be classified into: availability attacks [BNL12, XBB+15, JOB+18]
in which a set of poisoning points impacts the overall accuracy of the model; targeted attacks [KL17,
SHN+18, SMK+18] in which specific test instances are targeted for misclassification; and backdoor
attacks [GDGG17] in which backdoored testing points are misclassified. Poisoning attacks range in
the amount of knowledge the attacker has about the ML system, with white-box attacks assuming
full knowledge, and black-box attacks assuming minimal knowledge about the ML model.
The threat models for poisoning attacks defined in the literature rely on relatively strong
assumptions. In poisoning availability and backdoor attacks, an adversary controls a fraction of the
training data (e.g., 10%), while targeted attacks assume that the adversary has knowledge on the exact
targeted testing point during training. Moreover, in a backdoor attack, an adversary is assumed to
modify both the training and the testing dataset, by inserting a specific backdoor pattern in both. For
these reasons, existing poisoning attacks can be difficult to mount in practice, and even if successful,
there are many proposals for defending against them [JOB+18, DKK+18, TLM18, WYS+19].
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1.1 Our Contributions
Subpopulation poisoning attacks. We introduce a novel, realistic, form of data poisoning attack
which is particularly relevant for large, diverse datasets, which we call subpopulation attack. In
this attack, an adversary’s goal is to compromise the performance of a classifier on a particular
subpopulation of interest, while maintaining unaltered its performance for the rest of the population.
The advantanges of our novel subpopulation attack are that it requires no knowledge of the exact
model architecture and parameters, and most importantly, the attack does not modify points at test
time, which has been a common thread in prior backdoor poisoning attacks [GDGG17, TTM19].
We also uncover an interesting connection with research in algorithmic fairness, which shows that
ML classifiers might act differently for different minority groups [HPS+16, BG18]. We believe this
contributes to ML classifiers’ vulnerability to stealthy subpopulation attacks.
Subpopulation attack framework. We propose a modular framework for conducting subpopula-
tion attacks, instantiate it with different building blocks, and demonstrate its effectiveness on various
dataset types, including the UCI Adult dataset, CIFAR-10 for image classification, UTKFace for
face recognition, and IMDB reviews for sentiment analysis. We show that both end-to-end trained
models, as well as transfer learning models are vulnerable to this new attack vector. Additionally,
the size of the attack is small relative to the overall dataset and the poisoned points follow the
training data distribution, making it difficult to defend against. For instance, with only 126 points,
we can induce a classification error of 74% on a subpopulation in the CIFAR-10 dataset, while
maintaining similar accuracy to the clean model on points not in the subpopulation. In the UTKFace
face recognition dataset, we can get a classification error of 40% in one subpopulation with only 12
poisoning points. In contrast, in availability and backdoor attacks, the size of the poisoned data
is a fraction of the training data size. The requirements for mounting subpopulation attacks are
similar to targeted attacks (the attack of Shafahi et al. [SHN+18] requires 50 poisoned points),
but subpopulation attacks impact an entire natural subpopulation in the data, instead of a single
targeted point.
Defense Impossibility. Several defenses against availability attacks [JOB+18, DKK+18], targeted
attacks [PGH+19], and backdoor attacks [CCB+18, LDGG18, TLM18, WYS+19, VLT+20] have
been proposed. We believe their stealthiness makes subpopulation attacks more difficult to defend
against. To support this claim, we provide an impossibility result, showing that models based
on local decisions, such as mixture models and k-nearest neighbors, are inherently vulnerable to
subpopulation attacks. We leave full investigation of defenses against our novel attacks to future
work.
2 Poisoning Attacks Background
Consider a training set of examples D = {xi, yi}ni=1, with each xi ∈ X , yi ∈ Y , and drawn from some
distribution D. We consider multi-class classification tasks. The goal of a learning algorithm A,
when given dataset D is to return a function f maximizing Ex,y∼D [f(x) = y].
In settings with large training sets, machine learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where an
adversary is capable of adding data into the training set. This is typically because data is collected
from a large number of sources which cannot all be trusted. For example, OpenAI trained their
GPT-2 model on all webpages where at least 3 users of the social media site Reddit had interacted
with the link ([RWC+19]). Google also trains word prediction models from data collected from
Android phones ([HRM+18]). A recent survey on companies’ perception of machine learning threats
([KNL+20]) also highlighted poisoning attacks as one of the most concerning attacks.
More formally, the adversary adds m contaminants Dp = {xi, yi}mi=1 to the training set, so that
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the learner minimizes the poisoned objective L(f,D ∪Dp) rather than L(f,D). The poisoned set
Dp is constructed to achieve some adversarial objective L(A(D ∪Dp)).
Prior objectives for poisoning attacks distinguish between a targeted distribution to compromise
performance on, Dtarg, and a distribution to maintain the original classifier’s performance on, Dclean.
Then attacks can be measured in terms of two metrics, the collateral damage and the target damage.
A collateral damage constraint requires the accuracy of the classifier on Dclean to be unaffected,
while the target damage requires the performance on Dtarg to be compromised. Indeed, existing
poisoning attacks have been grouped into the following standard taxonomy:
Availability Attacks [BNL12], [MZ15a], [XBB+15], [JOB+18]: In an availability attack, the
adversary wishes to arbitrarily reduce the model’s classification performance. As such,
the target distribution is the original data distribution, and we can consider the collateral
distribution to be the empty set.
Targeted Attacks [KL17], [SMK+18], [SHN+18]: In a targeted attack, the adversary has a single
target point (x, y) they seek to misclassify. Then the target distribution Dtarg is only supported
on (x, y), while the collateral distribution removes (x, y) from the support: Dclean = D \ (x, y).
Backdoor Attacks [CLL+17], [GDGG17]): A backdoor attack is one in which the adversary is
able to modify one or a few features of their input, seeking to cause predictable misclassification
given the control of these few features. Then the collateral distribution is the natural data
distribution Dclean = D, while the target distribution shifts the original data distribution by
these few features, making Dtarg = Pert(D).
2.1 Related Work
Availability Attacks. Availability attacks based on gradient descent have been proposed for linear
regression [XBB+15, JOB+18], logistic regression [MZ15b], and SVM [BNL12]. SEVER [DKK+18]
uses SVD to identify points which bias gradients, while TRIM [JOB+18] identifies influential points
by their loss. Both methods remove identified poisoning during training to defend against the attack.
[DMP+19] study the transferability of availability attacks.
Backdoor Attacks. Clean-label backdoor attacks assume that the adversary does not control
the labeling function [TTM19]. Federated learning models have also been shown to be vulnerable to
backdoor attacks [BVH+18]. To defend against backdoor attacks, [TLM18] use SVD decomposition
on the latent space learned by the network to develop an outlier score. [LDGG18] combines pruning
and fine-tuning the network. [WYS+19] identify poisoning by measuring the minimum amount of
perturbation necessary to transform inputs into a target class.
Targeted Attacks. Koh et al. [KL17] construct targeted attacks with influence functions. Shafahi
et al. [SHN+18] introduce a clean-label, optimization-based targeted poisoning attack. Suciu et
al. [SMK+18] study the transferability of targeted attacks. Schuster et al. [SSMS20] show targeted
poisoning attacks on word embedding models used for NLP tasks.
3 Subpopulation Attacks
3.1 Threat Model
We consider a black-box adversary who knows nothing of the learning algorithm (model details,
training procedure) and does not have access to the original training dataset D. We do, however,
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allow the adversary an auxillary dataset Daux which is distinct from D, but sampled from the same
distribution. While this assumption could potentially be removed with a good generative model, we
leave this exploration to future work. Contrary to threat models used in prior work on backdoor
attacks ([CLL+17] and [GDGG17]), we consider an adversary who cannot modify points at test
time. We believe this to be a much more realistic threat model. The adversary must also remain
stealthy and practical by adding a small number of contaminants relative to the total dataset size.
3.2 Definition
A subpopulation attack is an interpolation between a targeted attack (misclassifying a single
point) and an availability attack (misclassifying as many points as possible). The adversary’s goal
is twofold—impact the predictions on inputs coming from a subpopulation in the data, but do
not impact the performance of the model on points outside this subpopulation. Crucially, this
subpopulation consists of natural data, and does not require modifying points to observe the attack,
as is the case for backdoor attacks. We allow the adversary to pick a subpopulation by selecting a
filter function, which partitions the population into the subpopulation to impact and the remainder
of the data, whose performance should not change. Formally, we write:
Definition 3.1. Subpopulation Attacks. Fix some learning algorithm A and training dataset D (not
necessarily known to the adversary). A subpopulation attack consists of a dataset of contaminants
Dp and a filter function F : X → {0, 1}. Dp is constructed to minimize the collateral damage and
maximize the target damage when appended to the training set:
Collat(F , Dp) = E(x,y)∼D [1 (A(D ∪Dp)(x) 6= y)− 1 (A(D)(x) 6= y) | F(x) = 0] (1)
Target(F , Dp) = E(x,y)∼D [1 (A(D ∪Dp)(x) 6= y)− 1 (A(D)(x) 6= y) | F(x) = 1] (2)
We will evaluate subpopulation attacks by reporting the collateral damage (1) and the target
damage (2) on the test set Dtest. A good attack will have small collateral damage and large target
damage, and may want to optimize some tradeoff between target and collateral with respect to the
poisoning set size.
The choice of filter function is as important to the adversary as the selection of contaminants.
There may be some choices of filter function which are hard to attack, as shown in Figure 1. The
rest of this section describes a framework for generating subpopulation attacks, as well as two
techniques for constructing filter functions, called FeatureMatch and ClusterMatch.
3.3 FeatureMatch
Our first filter function is FeatureMatch, which requires fine-grained manual annotation. In
addition to having access to realistic data points xi and labels yi, the adversary must have access to
a set of annotations ai. These annotations represent structure that is finer grained or separate from
the labels, such as race or age values for gender classification or color of automobiles in CIFAR-10. In
FeatureMatch, we use annotations exactly to identify subpopulations, as we write in Algorithm 1.
3.4 ClusterMatch
Our next filter function, ClusterMatch, replaces the need for manual annotation with clustering.
By identifying natural clusters in the data, attacking one may allow us to compromise the model
for that cluster but not elsewhere. In ClusterMatch (see Algorithm 2), the adversary produces
clusters and targets only a specific cluster.
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Figure 1: The red dashed circle is a good filter function—points in the circle could be easily
misclassified without harming any other predictions. The green dash-dot circle is a poor filter
function—it is impossible to misclassify points in that circle with a linear classifier without modifying
predictions of a significant fraction of points.
There are various design decisions that need to be taken care of before we can useClusterMatch.
We must specify a preprocessing function PreProcess, and a clustering algorithm. For preprocess-
ing phase, we first use the representation layer of a neural network (we test which layer is most
effective in Section 4), and then apply a PCA projection. For clustering, we use KMeans, but any
procedure for generating meaningful clusters on a given dataset should work.
One characteristic of ClusterMatch is that it does not allow the adversary to have direct
control over the subpopulations to attack, which partially limits but does not remove motivation
for subpopulation attacks. For example, consider an adversary who wishes to disrupt street sign
detection in a self-driving car through a subpopulation attack—they could run a clustering algorithm
to identify vulnerable street signs which will be easiest to target, increasing the impact and stealth
of their attack. In general, an adversary can generate clusterings and identify a cluster that is both
aligned with their goals and will be easy to attack.
Confidence Heuristic. We propose a heuristic to identify the most vulnerable subpopulations.
Deriving intuition from Figure 1, we hypothesize that the closer a subpopulation is to the model’s
decision boundary, the more easily it can be poisoned. We measure distance to the decision boundary
of a model f based on the mean confidence of points (xi, yi) (where yi is one-hot encoded) in the
subpopulation S:
Conff (S) = |S|−1
∑
xi,yi∈S f(xi) · yi.
In our experiments, we evaluate the reliability of this heuristic at identifying subpopulations of
highest risk.
Algorithm 1 FeatureMatch Algorithm to Leverage Manual Subpopulation Labeling
Input: X - features, C - manual subpopulation annotations, catt - target subpopulation annotation
return F = λ x, y, c : 1(c = catt)
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Algorithm 2 ClusterMatch Algorithm to Automatically Identify Subclasses
Input: X - feature values; kcluster - number of clusters; PP - preprocessing function
centers = Cluster(PreProcess(X), kcluster)
target = PickCluster(centers) . can be random - see also Section 3.4
return F = λ x : 1(ClosestCenter(PP (x), centers) == target)
3.5 Random Flipping Poisoning Algorithm
We adapt a common baseline algorithm, random flipping, to our setting. The subpopulation size
is m, and the adversary uses a poisoning rate α, adding αm poisoned points, which is very small
relative to the entire dataset size. To generate these points, the adversary samples αm points
satisfying the filter function from his auxiliary dataset Daux and adds these to the training set with
a targeted label. Label flipping ensures high target damage, while the filter function itself is what
guarantees low collateral—if it is a good enough separation, then the learning algorithm will be able
to independently learn the poisoned subpopulation, without impacting the remaining data points.
3.6 Subpopulation Attack Framework
In Algorithm 3, we combine the components of a subpopulation attack: creating subpopulations
with FeatureMatch or ClusterMatch, selecting a target subpopulation, and using a random
flipping poisoning attack to generate the poison set. The attack’s modularity allows each component
to be improved separately, which we hope will provide interesting avenues for future work.
We reiterate that our attack framework works in the most challenging black-box threat model,
in which the adversary has virtually no knowledge about the internals of the ML algorithm and
its hyper-parameters. All we require as part of the adversary knowledge is an auxiliary dataset
that follows the same distribution as the training data. This is a realistic requirement, since in
many domains such as image classification and NLP tasks public datasets are available. This is
clearly an advantage compared to most existing poisoning attacks, which work either in a white-box
model, or use attacks transferred from another model (which does not always result in successful
attacks [DMP+19]).
Algorithm 3 Generic Subpopulation Attack. In this work, Kadv consists only of a the dataset
Daux.
Input: Adversarial knowledge Kadv, attack size m
FilterFunctions = MakeFilterFunctions(Kadv) . e.g., Algorithm 1 or 2
F = SelectFilterFunction(FilterFunctions,Kadv)
return GenerateAttack(F ,m,Kadv) . e.g., Section 3.5
4 Experiments
After proposing subpopulation attacks and a framework to realize them in Section 3, we need to
explore the threat of subpopulation attacks in real datasets. We will first explore the effectiveness of
the attack in the end-to-end training scenario, comparing FeatureMatch and ClusterMatch
for subpopulation selection. Then, we show that subpopulation attacks are also effective in transfer
learning scenarios. We run experiments on four datasets from three modalities, to demonstrate the
generality of our attack. We believe the breadth of our experiments provides compelling evidence
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that subpopulation attacks are a useful and practical threat model for poisoning attacks against
ML. Complete details of our models are available in Appendix A.
4.1 Datasets
CIFAR-10. We use the standard split of CIFAR-10, splitting the train set into 25000 points for D
and 25000 points for Daux. We test with two model sizes: a small end-to-end trained convolutional
network called Conv, and a large model, VGG-16, fine-tuned from ImageNet weights, which we
refer to as VGG-FT. UTKFace. UTKFace is a facial recognition dataset, annotated with gender,
age, and race; we only use it for gender classification, removing children under age 15 to improve
performance, leaving 20054 images. We then split it into D, Daux, and Dt with 7000, 7000, and 6054
images, respectively. We consider two models: a small model, VGG-LL, which is VGG-16 fine-tuned
in the last layer, and a large model, VGG-FT, which is VGG-16 with all weights fine-tuned. Both
are initialized with ImageNet weights. UCI Adult. UCI Adult consists of 48843 rows, where
the goal is to use demographic information to predict whether a person’s income is above $50K
a year. Due to the simplicity of the dataset, the only model we consider is a feed-forward neural
network with a single hidden layer. IMBD Reviews. The IMDB movie review dataset [MDP+11]
consists of 50000 reviews of popular movies left by users on the IMDB1 website, together with the
reviews’ scores. The dataset is for binary classification, predicting whether the sentiment of the
review sentiment was positive (a high review score) or negative (a low review score). Given the rise
in popularity of pre-trained models (BERT [DCLT18], GPT-2 [RWC+19], XLNet [YDY+19]) for
natural language modeling, and the necessary extreme variance of the data used to train them, they
provide a perfect target for subpopulation attacks. We use BERT for our experiments, followed
by a single classifier layer. Our small model, BERT-LL, only fine-tunes BERT’s final transformer
block and the classifier, while our large model, BERT-FT, fine-tunes all of BERT’s transformer
blocks together with the classifier. For this dataset we split the training set into 12500 points for D
and 12500 for Daux.
4.2 End-to-end Training.
We demonstrate that subpopulation attacks are effective for end-to-end training of neural networks,
which has been a difficult setting for poisoning attacks on neural networks. Backdoor poisoning
attacks need a fairly large amount of poisoning data to be effective [GDGG17], while targeted
attacks against neural networks trained end-to-end need on the order of 50 points to attack a single
point at testing [SHN+18]. We investigate our attacks on CIFAR-10 and UCI Adult. We train
Conv on CIFAR-10 and the UCI Adult model end-to-end. We test FeatureMatch on UCI Adult,
with the combination of education level, race, and gender as annotations. We also use KMeans
for ClusterMatch on both UCI Adult and CIFAR-10. For UCI Adult, due to large variance
in FeatureMatch subpopulation sizes, we remove subpopulations with greater than 100 or less
than 10 data points. We report FeatureMatch results in Table 2, and ClusterMatch results
in Tables 3 and 4. Collateral values for all experiments, including transfer learning presented later,
are found in Table 5. These are the mean collateral damages over the worst 5 subpopulations, as
measured by target damage.
Effectiveness of Attacks On UCI Adult, FeatureMatch is somewhat successful, causing a
target damage of 25% for one subpopulation and an average of 19.5% over five subpopulations,
1https://www.imdb.com/
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Target Damage Input Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
Worst-10 0.066 0.084 0.081 0.063 0.084 0.086
Worst-5 0.073 0.092 0.094 0.073 0.096 0.123
Table 1: Results for ClusterMatch on CIFAR-10 + Conv using six different layers for clustering.
when attacked with a poisoning rate of α = 2. These groups attacked all have comparable ages,
genders, and races, impacting the fairness of the classifier for those groups.
We find ClusterMatch is effective on CIFAR-10: with a poisoning rate of only α = 0.5, one
subpopulation reaches 16.1% target damage (with 158 poisoned points), and five subpopulations
reach an average of 12.6% target damage (with an average of 151 poisoned points). The collateral
is also low, on average 1.41% for the top 5 subpopulations by target damage. We also find
ClusterMatch is effective on UCI Adult, reaching 66.7% targeted damage on a single population,
and an average of 36.7% target damage over five subpopulations at α = 2. This is convincing
evidence that ClusterMatch’s ability to leverage the data to construct subpopulations allows it
to produce more effective subpopulations.
Optimizing ClusterMatch We experiment with designing good ClusterMatch clusters on
CIFAR-10, by running KMeans to produce 100 subpopulations at six different layers of Conv. For
all layers, we project to 10 dimensions using PCA. We find that ClusterMatch is most effective
when using clusters constructed using the last layer of Conv. Notably, the top 5 clusters using
the last layer representation achieve 12.3% target damage, while ClusterMatch using the input
features only reaches 7.3% target damage, as shown in Table 1. We use this insight for all of our
remaining experiments. We also find the confidence heuristic holds loosely. For instance, the average
target damage over the lowest 10 confidence clusters is 4.57%, while for the highest 10 confidence
ones it is 0.84%.
4.3 Transfer Learning
We evaluate the effectiveness of subpopulation attacks on transfer learning, on CIFAR-10, UTKFace,
and IMDB. We run FeatureMatch on VGG-LL on UTKFace, using the combination of race and
bucketed ages (bucketed into [15, 30], [30, 45], [45, 60], [60,∞)) as the annotations, presenting results
in Table 2. We present results for ClusterMatch with 100 clusters generated with KMeans, on
VGG-LL on UTKFace and BERT-LL in Table 3, and present results for large models in Table 4.
We find FeatureMatch is effective on UTKFace, reaching a target damage of 40% for one
subpopulation and an average of 19.2% over five subpopulations, both at a poisoning rate of α = 2.
However, ClusterMatch reaches a target damage of 55.6% on one subpopulation and an average
of 33.5% over five subpopulations. This reiterates the results from end-to-end training on UCI
Adult: ClusterMatch tends to outperform FeatureMatch when both are applicable.
We also find that ClusterMatch is effective in general. On the IMDB data with BERT-LL,
for example, ClusterMatch manages to cause a target damage of 24.1% in one subpopulation, and
an average of 18.7% over five subpopulations when α = 2, and on BERT-FT the attack has even
better performance, with an average of 24.9% over five subpopulations. Here maximum registered
collateral damage was 0.34% and 0.85%, for BERT-LL and BERT-FT respectively, with α = 2.
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Dataset Task
Clean α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 2
Acc PA TD PA TD PA TD
UTKFace + VGG-LL
Worst-10
0.846
0.813 0.054 0.781 0.086 0.723 0.144
Worst-5 0.801 0.094 0.755 0.140 0.703 0.192
Worst-1 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.400
UCI Adult
Worst-10
0.837
0.751 0.103 0.702 0.148 0.691 0.16
Worst-5 0.724 0.143 0.606 0.21 0.654 0.195
Worst-1 0.489 0.311 0.333 0.467 0.75 0.250
Table 2: Clean accuracy, poisoned accuracy (PA), and target damage (TD) for UCI Adult and
UTKFace attacked with FeatureMatch.
4.4 Evaluating the Confidence Heuristic.
We evaluate the confidence heuristic by measuring the gap in target damage between high confidence
clusters and low confidence clusters, as discussed in Section 3.4. We measure the 10 highest
confidence clusters and the 10 lowest confidence clusters at a poisoning rate of α = 2 on small and
large models on each dataset, except for UCI Adult, where we only have one model. For CIFAR with
Conv, we find that low confidence subpopulations have a mean target damage of 4.57%, while high
confidence subpopulations have a mean target damage of 0.84%, indicating that high confidence
subpopulations are on average more difficult to attack. With VGG-FT, these numbers reverse:
low confidence subpopulations have a mean target damage of 10.84% while high confidences have
21.80%. On UTK, the same reversal happens: with VGG-LL, moving from 6.35% on low confidence
to 0.99% on high confidence, to, with VGG-FT, with 10.13% on low confidence and 21.37% on
high confidence. We observe a similar phenomenon also in the text classification task. Here, we
look at the 10 lowest and highest confidence clusters with and we observe that with BERT-LL the
average target damage over the lowest confidence clusters is 10.49% while it shrinks to ˜0.2% for
the highest confidence ones. On BERT-FT, however, we observe an inversion of the trend with low
confidence clusters receiving ˜3% average target damage, and high confidence ones receiving 14.23%
average target damage.
These call into question the confidence heuristic, indicating a breakdown which we hypothesize
being correlated with the model size. Our intuition from Figure 1 that low-confidence populations
are easier to attack holds on small models, such as linear models. More thoroughly understanding
which subpopulations are at higher risk is an interesting topic for future investigation.
5 Impossibility of Defenses
We present here an impossibility result for defending against subpopulation attacks, based on a
model of learning theory relying on mixture models from [Fel19]. Informally, a k-subpopulation
mixture distribution is a mixture of k subpopulations of disjoint support, with mixing coefficients
αi, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. A subpopulation mixture learner is locally dependent if the learner makes local
decisions based only on subpopulations. We consider binary classifiers that use the 0-1 loss. We use
a simplified version of the [Fel19] model to prove the following result:
Theorem 5.1. For any dataset D of size n drawn from a k-subpopulation mixture distribution,
there exists a subpopulation poisoning attack Dp of size ≤ n/k that causes all locally dependent
k-subpopulation mixture learners A return A(D∪Dp) = A(D) with probability < 1/2. Additionally,
if α is the weight of the smallest subpopulation in the mixture distribution, then a subpopulation
attack of size less than 2αn suffices with probability at least 1− exp(−αn/2).
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Dataset Task
Clean α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 2 Subpop
Acc PA TD PA TD PA TD Size
UTKFace + VGG-LL
Worst-10
0.846
0.778 0.073 0.723 0.128 0.557 0.294 60.7
Worst-5 0.726 0.094 0.688 0.132 0.485 0.335 47.8
Worst-1 0.556 0.222 0.556 0.222 0.222 0.556 40.3
IMDB + BERT-LL
Worst-10
0.893
0.731 0.084 0.706 0.109 0.682 0.132 144.3
Worst-5 0.721 0.124 0.661 0.162 0.636 0.187 160.4
Worst-1 0.788 0.193 0.633 0.220 0.612 0.241 113.0
CIFAR-10 + Conv
Worst-10
0.802
0.579 0.085 0.578 0.086 0.542 0.122 111.5
Worst-5 0.570 0.126 0.572 0.123 0.531 0.165 120.9
Worst-1 0.665 0.161 0.657 0.170 0.598 0.228 126.8
UCI Adult
Worst-10
0.837
0.746 0.121 0.658 0.24 0.723 0.224 41.1
Worst-5 0.63 0.191 0.628 0.343 0.629 0.367 45.1
Worst-1 0.667 0.333 0.5 0.375 0.333 0.667 48.3
Table 3: Clean accuracy, poisoned accuracy (PA), and target damage (TD) for different datasets
attacked with ClusterMatch. On BERT we measure the performance sampling 10 clusters at
the lowest, medium, and highest confidence levels, due to running time constraints. Subpopulation
sizes are averages over poison rates.
Dataset Task
Clean α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 2 Subpop
Acc PA TD PA TD PA TD Size
UTKFace + VGG-FT
Worst-10
0.963
0.968 0.218 0.992 0.329 0.978 0.405 57.3
Worst-5 0.993 0.244 0.997 0.385 0.974 0.432 38.1
Worst-1 1.000 0.286 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.455 29.0
IMDB + BERT-FT
Worst-10
0.913
0.845 0.051 0.797 0.100 0.777 0.205 134.3
Worst-5 0.759 0.096 0.756 0.149 0.748 0.249 163.5
Worst-1 0.772 0.209 0.744 0.237 0.654 0.346 82.3
CIFAR-10 + VGG-FT
Worst-10
0.863
0.683 0.206 0.468 0.518 0.454 0.511 175.6
Worst-5 0.656 0.294 0.363 0.616 0.367 0.627 180.9
Worst-1 0.570 0.426 0.262 0.738 0.258 0.742 144.0
Table 4: Clean accuracy, poisoned accuracy (PA), and target damage (TD) for large models trained
on datasets that have been attacked with ClusterMatch. On BERT we measure the performance
sampling 10 clusters at the lowest, medium, and highest confidence levels, due to running time
constraints.
Collateral Damage CIFAR-10 UCI Adult UTKFace IMDB
Mean Small 1.4% 1.4% 0.3% -0.25%
Mean Large 1.3% N/A 2.9% 0.05%
Table 5: Mean collateral for poisoning attacks on worst 5 subpopulations by target damage with
α = 1. Small models are Conv for CIFAR-10, VGG-LL for UTKFace, and BERT-LL for IMDB.
Large models are VGG-FT for CIFAR-10, VGG-FT for UTKFace, and BERT-FT for IMDB.
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Essentially, if the learning algorithm makes subpopulation-wide decisions, then it will inherently
be susceptible to subpopulation attacks. [Fel19] shows that this structure holds for k-nearest
neighbors, mixture models, overparameterized linear models, and suggests (based on some empirical
evidence) that it holds for neural networks as well. The formal definitions, theorem statement, and
proof can be found in Appendix B.
6 Conclusion
We propose subpopulation data poisoning attacks, a novel type of poisoning attacks which work in
the most challenging black-box adversarial model, require few poisoning points, and do not require
the target testing data to be modified. We show two techniques to instantiate subpopulation attacks,
called FeatureMatch and ClusterMatch. FeatureMatch relies on manual annotations,
while ClusterMatch automatically generates subpopulations based on the data. We provide
experimental verification that subpopulation attacks are a legitimate threat using a diverse collection
of datasets, including tabular data, image data, and text data. We show that models trained end-to-
end, as well as those trained with transfer learning are vulnerable. We also prove an impossibility
result, suggesting some learners cannot defend against subpopulation attacks. Avenues of future
work include investigating which subpopulations are at highest risk for different scenarios, and
addressing the challenges of protecting ML against this novel threat.
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A Experiment Details
Here we will provide a brief overview of the multiple models used in the experimental phase and the
hyper-parameters used in training them.
• For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we use Conv and VGG-FT. Conv is a small convolutional neural
network, consisting of a convolutional layer, three blocks consisting of 2 convolutional layers
and an average pooling layer each, and a final convolution and reduce mean operation. This is
trained with SGD using a learning rate of and a weight decay of 0.02, following . VGG-FT
trains a VGG-16 model pretrained on ImageNet, fine tuning all layers for 12 epochs with
Adam with a learning rate of 0.001.
• For UTKFace, we use VGG-LL and VGG-FT. VGG-LLonly trains the last layer of a
VGG-16 model pretrained on ImageNet, while VGG-FT trains all layers. For both, we
train for 12 epochs with Adam w,using a learning rate of 0.001 for VGG-LL and 0.0001 for
VGG-FT. For both, we use `2 regularization of 0.01 on the classification layer.
• For the IMDB review dataset, we use BERT-LL and BERT-FT. These models use the same
architecture and implementation from the Huggingface Transformers library [WDS+19]. They
are both based on a pre-trained bert-base-uncased instance, with 12 transformer blocks,
and one linear layer for classification. The main difference between the two models is that for
BERT-FT the entire model is fine-tuned over the IMDB training set, while with BERT-LL
we freeze all the layers of the model except for the last transformer block and the classifier
before fine-tuning. Both models are then fine-tuned on vectors of 256 tokens, for 4 epochs,
with a learning rate of 10−5 and mini batch size of 8.
• For UCI Adult, we use a neural network with one hidden layer of 10 ReLU units, trained for a
maximum of 3000 iterations using scikit-learn default settings for all other parameters. We
drop the ’education’, ’native-country’, and ’fnlwgt’ columns due to significant correlation with
other columns, and one-hot encode categorical columns.
B Proof for Section 5
In this section, we will describe a theoretical model in which subpopulation attacks are impossible
to defend against. The model is closely related to two existing theoretical models. First is the
corrupted clusterable dataset model of [LSO19], which was used to analyze the robustness to label
noise of neural networks trained with early stopping. The second relevant model is the subpopulation
mixture model of [Fel19] (appearing at STOC 2020), which they used to justify the importance of
memorization in learning and explain the gap between differentially private learning and nonprivate
learning. Our model generalizes the [LSO19] model, and simplifies the [Fel19] model.
The two key components of our model are the datasets, which consist of potentially noisy
subpopulations of data, and the classifiers, which assign a uniform class to each cluster. [LSO19]
show that the neural network architecture and training procedure they use produces this set of
classifiers if label noise is not too large. [Fel19] shows that overparameterized linear models, k-nearest
neighbors, and mixture models are examples of these classifiers, conjecturing (based on empirical
evidence) that neural networks are as well.
Definition B.1 (Noisy k-Subpopulation Mixture Distribution). A noisy k-subpopulation mixture
distribution D over X ×Y consists of k subpopulations {Di}ki=1, with distinct, known, supports over
X , (unknown) mixture weights, and labels drawn from subpopulation-specific Bernoulli distributions.
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We write the supports of each subpopulation {Xi ⊂ X}ki=1. By distinct supports, we mean that
∀i, j ∈ [k] with i 6= j, SuppX (Di) ∩ SuppX (Dj) = ∅. Furthermore, because the supports are known,
there exists a function CD : X → [k] returning the subpopulation of the given sample.
We write the unknown mixture weights as α = {αi}ki=1; note that
∑
i αi = 1. The subpopulation-
specific label distributions are written {Bernoulli(pi)}ki=1. The full distribution can be written as
D = ∑i αiDi.
Notice that the existence of CD implies that the classification task on D is exactly the problem of
estimating the correct label for each subpopulation. We formalize this by introducing k-subpopulation
mixture learners.
Definition B.2 (k-Subpopulation Mixture Learner). A subpopulation mixture learner A takes as
input a dataset D of size n, and the subpopulation function CD of a noisy k-subpopulation mixture
distribution D, and returns a classifier f : [k]→ {0, 1}. On a fresh sample x, the classifier returns
f(CD(x)). We call the learner locally dependent if f(i) depends only on {y|(x, y) ∈ D∩SuppX (Di)},
that is, only labels from those data points which belong to the specific subpopulation.
The learners considered in both [LSO19] (particular shallow wide neural networks) and [Fel19]
(k-nearest neighbors, mixture models, overparameterized linear models) are locally dependent.
For our main theorem, we consider learners that are binary classifiers, and select a label that
minimizes the cumulative error on each subpopulation using the 0-1 loss.
Theorem B.1. For any dataset D of size n drawn from a noisy k-subpopulation mixture distribution
and subpopulation function CD, there exists a subpopulation poisoning attack Dp of size ≤ n/k that
causes all locally dependent k-subpopulation mixture learners A that minimize 0-1 loss in binary
classification return:
A(D ∪Dp) = A(D) with probability < 1
2
.
Additionally, if α = mini αi is the weight of the smallest subpopulation in the mixture distribution,
then a subpopulation attack of size less than 2αn suffices with probability at least 1− exp(−αn/2).
Proof. For both parts of the theorem, the poisoning attack is the same: find the subpopulation with
the fewest samples in D, and add samples from that subpopulation with flipped labels. No learner
can distinguish between the case that the original labels are correct, and the case where the flipped
labels are correct. Since the learner makes decisions based on subpopulations it will classify the
subpopulation according to the majority label.
We address the first part of the theorem by contradiction. Assume that there exists a dataset
D of size n drawn from a noisy k-subpopulation mixture distribution, such that for any poisoning
attack Dp of size ≤ n/k, there exists a locally-dependent k-subpopulation mixture learner A for
which:
A(D ∪Dp) = A(D), with probability > 1
2
.
Assume without loss of generality that K = arg mini |D ∩ SuppX (Di)|, and write DK = D ∩
SuppX (Di). Our attack operates by taking DK and flipping all of its labels, producing DpK .
Suppose we provide the learner with the original dataset D and the returned classifier is f . On
the other hand, when we provide the learner with the poisoned dataset D′ = D||DpK , the returned
classifier is f ′.
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Datasets D and D′ differ in |DK | records, which is less than n/k, according to the pigeon’s
principle (K being the smallest subpopulation). From the properties we assumed about the learner
A , we have:
A(D′) = A(D), with probability > 1
2
,
which implies that learners f and f ′ return the same label for subpopulation K: f(K) = f ′(K).
On the other hand, the learners f and f ′ are locally dependent, and make their decisions only
based on subpopulations to minimize the 0-1 loss. Because we added in D′ enough points in the
subpopulation K to flip the decision, it turns out that: f ′(K) = 1− f(K).
But these two statements result in a contradiction, which proves the first part of the theorem.
We now turn to the second part of the theorem statement, to improve the bounds on the size of
the smallest subpopulation. This argument is particularly powerful when the mixture distribution
does not have uniform weights.
For a sample from a noisy k-subpopulation mixture distribution, consider the smallest subpopu-
lation j = arg mini αi and its mixture coefficient α = αj .
The number of points in subpopulation j is
∑n
i=1 Bernoulli(αj). We use the following multi-
plicative Chernoff bound, which holds for δ > 0:
Pr[X > (1 + δ)µ] < exp
(
−δ
2µ
2δ
)
.
Setting µ = αjn = αn and δ = 1 in the above Chernoff bound, we find:
Pr[|D ∩ SuppX (Dj)| > 2αn] ≤ exp(−αn
2
).
This concludes our proof, as the size of the smallest subpopulation is less than 2αn with
probability at least 1− exp(−αn/2).
For mixture distributions with non-uniform weights, the Chernoff bound provides more effective
bounds than the pigeonhole principle. For example, if n = 1000, the smallest mixture coefficient
α = 0.01, and k = 5, the Chernoff bound approach ensures that a poisoning attack of size 20 suffices
with probability > 1 − exp(−5) = 99.3%, whereas the pigeonhole principle requires a poisoning
attack of size 200.
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